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WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES ARE STILL NEW:
WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY FOR PRIVACY PROTECTION
GAlA BERNSTEIN*
ABSTRACT: Early intervention in the regulation of new technologies is
highly controversial. In this Article, I seek to depolarize the early interven-
tion debate and examine where timing becomes of the essence in the
shaping of new technologies. At the outset, I reframe the debate in terms
of social shaping in lieu of intervention.
I focus the social shaping inquiry on the development of non-privacy
norms among the Internet's commercial users in order to shed light on
the timing quandary. Currently, over a decade after commercial entities
started collecting personal information on the Internet, the law has not
restricted these collection practices. Efforts at self-regulation have failed
and Internet users overall have not adopted technological measures to
protect their privacy. Empirical data shows an increase in the use of pri-
vacy threatening devices, such as cookies and spyware. The data shows
that commercial non-privacy norms on the Internet have become en-
trenched among the Internet's commercial users.
Three technological characteristics of the Internet appear to be at the
crux of the fast diffusion of commercial non-privacy norms. These charac-
teristics are: the Internet's critical mass point quality (and related network
effects); its decentralized diffusion process; and the enablement of con-
cealed monitoring.
I suggest that where a technology's characteristics are likely to cause
fast entrenchment, timing may become of the essence. Insights from sev-
eral fields support this conclusion. The theory of path dependence shows
that where costs are sunk into one option, an alternative option even if
preferable is less likely to be adopted. Further, the theory of closure dem-
onstrates that after an initial period where a technology's design and func-
tion evolves it tends to stabilize, reaching closure-from that moment
onwards change is less likely. Finally, law and social norms theory shows
that laws are less effective where they contradict social norms.
I posit that the lessons learnt from the case of Internet privacy could
be instrumental to the resolution of other technological controversies.
* Associate Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law. I would
like to thank David Barnes, Shay David, Frank Pasquale, Erik Lillquist, Helen
Nissenbaum, Amit Solomon, Charles Sullivan, Peter Swire and Sarah Waldeck for
their comments and for helpful conversations. I would also like to thank Michael
Carroll for inviting me to participate in this symposium. Finally, I am grateful to
Joseph Farano and Monica Kostrzewa for excellent research assistance and to the
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Specifically, I propose that where a technology's qualities show that timing
may be of the essence for. privacy protection, both legal and technological
modes of social shaping should be adjusted to reflect sensitivity to timing.
Technological shaping is more likely to be effective through proactive con-
certed design at the outset. For legal decision-makers the technology's
sensitivity to timing points to the need to consider timing as an important
factor in the decision-making process, accounting for potentially more
limited options at a later stage.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE introduction of new technologies that impose privacy threats is
frequently accompanied by calls for intervention to shield individual
privacy.' Proponents of intervention often support their position by stat-
ing that the law should not lag behind technology. At the same time, con-
cerns are sounded against the hazards of early intervention in the
regulation of new technologies.2 Apprehension is motivated by the desire
to avoid action before the full potential of a technology is realized. It is
feared that progress could be impeded through the obstruction of yet un-
realized technological potential.
Early intervention in the regulation of new technologies is highly con-
troversial. Its contentious status is due at least in part to intervention mea-
sures taken in highly politicized technological debates, such as the stem
cell research controversy. 3 In this Article, I seek to depolarize the early
intervention debate and unpack the issue of timing in the shaping of new
technologies. 4 At the outset, I undertake a linguistic shift, by replacing
the term "intervention" with the concept of "social shaping"-a linguistic
shift that I believe helps legitimize the goal of shaping our technologies in
our image.
My goal in this Article is not to advocate early social shaping across
the board. Instead, I seek to commence an inquiry to examine when tim-
ing becomes of the essence in the shaping of new technologies. The ques-
tion is particularly pertinent in the area of privacy-where throughout
1. See, e.g., Katherine Delaney, RFID: Privacy Yearin Review: America's Privacy
Laws Fall Short with RFID Regulation, 1 ISJLP 543 (2005).
2. See, e.g., Jack E. Brown, New Law for the Internet, 28 ARiz. ST. LJ. 1243
(1996); Fred H. Cate, Law in Cyberspace, 39 How. L.J. 565 (1996). For a thorough
analysis of this critique, see Michael H. Shapiro, Is Bioethics Broke? On the Idea of
Ethics and Law "Catching Up" with Technology, 33 IND. L. REv. 17 (1999).
3. See, e.g., William L. Saunders, Lethal Experimentation on Human Beings: Roe's
Effect on Bioethics, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 817 (2004).
4. For an analysis of timing in the regulation of new technologies in the con-
text of the Fourth Amendment, see Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801
(2004).
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history, new technologies have repeatedly threatened privacy-yet reac-
tion times and the effectiveness of privacy protection have varied. 5
In this Article, I focus on privacy norms created through the collec-
tion of personal information by commercial entities on the Internet. As
the use of the Internet became widespread in the mid-1990s, commercial
web sites and commercial profiling companies began collecting personal
information using technological devices, such as cookies. 6 Despite public
indignation, a survey of empirical data I have conducted a decade later
indicates an overall increase in the use of privacy-threatening technologi-
cal devices by commercial entities on the Internet. This supports the con-
clusion that non-privacy norms related to the collection of personal
information have become entrenched among the Internet's commercial
users.
7
The entrenchment of non-privacy norms among commercial users oc-
curred rapidly. Currently, a decade after commercial non-privacy norms
first appeared on the Internet, the law has not restricted commercial per-
sonal information collection practices.8 Efforts at self-regulation have
failed, and most Internet users have not adopted technological measures
to protect their privacy.9 The benefit of hindsight provided by the evolu-
tion of commercial non-privacy norms on the Internet leads to several
insights.
Three technological characteristics of the Internet appear to be at the
crux of the fast diffusion of non-privacy norms. These characteristics are:
(i) the Internet's critical mass point quality (and related network effects),
5. For some examples of technological privacy threats and legal reactions, see
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438
(1928); WARREN FREEDMAN, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN THE COMPUTER AGE 93-112
(1987); George Annas, Genetic Privacy: There Ought to Be a Law, 4 TEX. REV. L. &
POL. 9 (1999); Louis D. Brandeis & Samuel D. Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv.
L. REV. 193 (1890).
6. On collection practices and data mining strategies, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE,
THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 22-26
(2004); Tal Zarsky, "Mine Your Own Business": Making the Case for the Implications of
the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 1 (2002/2003).
7. See Gaia Bernstein, The Paradoxes of Technological Diffusion, CONN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2006).
8. See In re Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy Litigation, MDL No. M-00-1 381, 2001 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 16947 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2001); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litiga-
tion, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d
1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
9. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Privacy Self Regulation: A Decade of Disappointment
(Mar. 4, 2005), http://www.epic.org/reports/decadedisappoint.pdf (last visited
Feb. 7, 2006); MICROSOFr CORP., MICROSOFT P3P IMPLEMENTATION IN INTERNET Ex-
PLORER 6.0 AND WINDOWS XP: FACT SHEET, http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/
press/2001/marOl/PrivacyToolsEfs.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2006); ERNST &
YOUNG, ENABLING P3P: WORKSHOP ON MACHINE READABLE PRIVACY POLICIES 4 (Jan.
2004), http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20040122enablingp3p.pdf (last visited Feb. 7,
2006); ERNST & YOUNG SECURITYSPACE, COMPACT PRIVACY POLICY REPORT (Apr. 1,
2003), http://www.securityspace.com (last visited Feb. 7, 2006).
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(ii) the Internet's decentralized diffusion process and (iii) the enablement
of concealed monitoring. I show that the Internet's critical mass point
and decentralized diffusion process directly contributed to the fast en-
trenchment of non-privacy norms. Diffusion accelerated when it reached
the critical mass point, inducing a rapid spread of developing norms,
while decentralization enabled all users to actively re-design the technol-
ogy facilitating the installation of privacy-threatening devices. Further, in-
visible monitoring on the Internet reduced the likelihood that Internet
users will resort to self-help to protect their privacy. The absence of a
perceptible threat resulted in individuals' reluctance to act to protect their
privacy, contributing to the transformation of privacy from an individual
right to a public value. As individual users failed to insist on their privacy
preferences, the design of Internet architecture was left to the privacy
preferences of commercial actors.
I then suggest that where a technology's characteristics are likely to
cause fast entrenchment of non-privacy norms, decision-makers should
pay particular attention to timing. This conclusion is based on insights
from economic theory, science and technology studies theory, and law and
social norms theory.
Commercial non-privacy norms on the Internet are characterized by
path dependence, which focuses on how the path taken today is affected
by the path that was selected in the past. 10 Many web sites and commer-
cial profiling companies are dependent on the continued concerted prac-
tice of concealed collection of personal information. A shift to alternative
marketing practices that do not involve concealed information collection
is likely to prove inefficient and therefore likely to be resisted by these
commercial actors. Furthermore, the Internet's critical mass point and
decentralization qualities make it particularly susceptible to path depen-
dence. The Internet's commercial and individual users are highly interde-
pendent and are unlikely to shift unilaterally to an alternative path,
particularly because the Internet lacks a centralized authority that could
dictate such a shift.
The Social Shaping of Technology (SST) theory of closure sheds ad-
ditional light on the evolution of commercial non-privacy Internet norms.
Closure is the point at which controversy surrounding design and uses of a
technology subsides and specific forms and norms become generally ac-
cepted. Once closure is reached, interpretive flexibility is lost and is hard
to regain.1 On the Internet, norms became rapidly entrenched and a
10. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REx,. 127, 129 (discussing structure
driven path dependence).
11. See WIEBE E. BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES AND BULBS: TOWARD A THEORY
OF SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE 85 (1995); Stewart Russell & Robin Williams, Social
Shaping of Technology: Frameworks, Findings and Implications for Policy with Glossary of
Social Shaping Concepts, in SHAPING TECHNOLOY, GUIDING POLICY: CONCEPTS,
SPACES AND Toots 37, 120 (Knut H. Sorensen & Robin Williams eds., 2002).
[Vol. 51: p. 921
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closure process that would normally evolve over decades was consum-
mated at an exponential rate. In 2000, controversy regarding commercial
non-privacy norms erupted. 12 Yet, individual Internet users failed to pro-
mote an alternative Internet perception. After 2000, as norms rapidly en-
trenched, interpretive flexibility was quickly lost and-left unchallenged-
non-privacy norms prevailed among the Internet's commercial users.
Finally, law and social norms theory shows that laws are less likely to
be effective where they sharply digress from existing social norms. 13 A law
that diverges from existing social norms has a reduced likelihood of being
effective because it faces the challenge of reforming societal structures of
social stigma. 14 Consequently, any attempt at legal social shaping a dec-
ade after the appearance of non-privacy norms is likely to encounter a far
greater hurdle than had a similar attempt been taken before such norms
became entrenched.
Based on these insights I posit that where a new technology enables
concealed monitoring, is characterized by a critical mass point quality and
features decentralized diffusion, the window of opportunity for privacy
protection is narrower. I do not maintain these are the only conditions
that affect the timing for privacy protection. I suggest, however, that
where these conditions exist they should raise a red flag for decision-mak-
ers to carefully consider the timing of social shaping.
Applying this conclusion to the case of Internet commercial privacy
norms, the window of opportunity may already be partially closed, and
alternatives at this point are more limited. Yet, my goal in this Article lies
beyond the transformation of commercial non-privacy norms on the In-
ternet. New technologies with the characteristics that lead to rapid en-
trenchment of non-privacy norms are likely to emerge. Invisible
monitoring devices are increasingly embedded in technological innova-
tions. The Internet, with its critical mass point and decentralized diffusion
qualities, is likely to serve as a platform on which other non-privacy norms
will materialize.
Where a technology's qualities show that timing may be of the es-
sence, both legal and technological modes of social shaping should be
adjusted to reflect sensitivity to timing. I propose that technological shap-
ing is more likely to be effective through proactive concerted design at the
outset. Privacy protection is likely to be more effective if included as a
functional component in the initial design than if designed later for indi-
12. See, e.g., Amid Protests, DOUBLECLICK AND ABAcus Announce Plans for $1
Billion Merger, ELEc. ADVER. & MARKETPLACE REP., June 29, 1999, at 13.
13. See Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Prob-
lem, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 607, 608 (2000); Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of
Norms: Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. RiV. 1901, 1926-28
(2000).
14. See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REv.
943, 986-87, 999 (1995); Paul H. Robinson, Why Does Criminal Law Care What the
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vidual user adoption. Turning to legal shaping, I suggest that the technol-
ogy's sensitivity to timing does not necessarily mandate early legal shaping.
It does, however, require consideration of timing as an important factor in
decision-making, accounting for potentially more limited options at a later
stage.
The Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I propose the linguistic
shift from "intervention" to "social shaping." In Part III, I describe the
entrenchment of commercial non-privacy norms on the Internet and iden-
tify the technological characteristics that contributed to rapid norms en-
trenchment. In Part IV, I examine insights from economic theory, science
and technology studies, and law and social norms theory that point to the
significance of timing under the identified technological conditions. Fi-
nally, in Part V, I examine ways in which timing should affect technologi-
cal and legal modes of social shaping.
II. FROM INTERVENTION TO SOCIAL SHAPING
In this Part, I examine the concept of "early intervention" and urge a
change in the terminology used in new technologies' regulation discourse.
Specifically, I propose that the term "intervention" should be replaced
with "social shaping." I start by examining objections raised to early inter-
vention with new technologies. I then put forward two reasons for replac-
ing intervention with social shaping. First, intervention is tied to the
notion of technological determinism, which de-legitimizes the notion of
proactively shaping our technologies in our image. Second, use of social
shaping, in lieu of "intervention" or "design," corrects a current percep-
tual imbalance by placing legal measures and technological measures on
equal grounds with regard to their perceived degree of intrusiveness.
A. Opposition to Early Intervention
A common complaint regarding the regulation of new technologies is
that the law is slow to react to technological change. 15 Yet, a converse
critique often sounded by policy-makers and commentators warns against
the hazards of early intervention in the regulation of new technologies.
Early intervention can take different forms. For instance, early interven-
tion can take place at the invention stage, banning an innovation from
being created in the first place.1 6 Conversely, it can occur later at the
diffusion stage, prohibiting the diffusion of a new technology that was pre-
15. See, e.g., James E. Bailey, An Analytical Framework for Resolving the Issues
Raised by the Interaction Between Reproductive Technology and the Law of Inheritance, 47
DEPAUL L. REv. 743, 814 (1998).; Shapiro, supra note 2.
16. See, e.g., Assisted Human Reproduction Act Prohibited Activities, 2004
S.C., ch. 2, s. 5 (Can.) (Canadian law prohibiting human cloning); Human Repro-
ductive Cloning Act 2001, ch. 23, s. 1 (Eng.) (British law prohibiting human
cloning).
926 [Vol. 51: p. 921
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viously invented. 17 Early intervention, however, is not necessarily a com-
plete ban. Restrictions on invention or use are another form of early
intervention.' 8 While it is usually legislative regulation that is perceived as
early intervention, court rulings can have the same effect.' 9
The resistance to early intervention has several justifications. Mainly,
opponents of early intervention caution against intervening before the so-
cial uses of a new technology are fully realized.20 For instance, in the early
days of the Internet, many commentators, practitioners and industry lead-
ers advocated a wait and see approach. They cautioned against moving
forward before Internet technology and its usage were fully developed and
fully understood.2
1
The cautionary approach to early intervention stems from the belief
that technological innovation promotes human progress and that human
17. See, for example, legal restrictions on the diffusion of nuclear weapons.
42 U.S.C. § 2014, 2131(v) & (cc) (2005); 18 U.S.C. § 831 (2005).
18. See, e.g., President George Bush Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research, 37
PUB. PAPERS 32 (Aug. 9, 2001) (restricting federal funding of stem cell research to
research conducted on sixty existing stem cell lines); Gaia Bernstein, The Socio-
Legal Acceptance of New Technologies: A Close Look at Artificial Insemination 77 WASHl. L.
Rrv. 1035 (2002) (describing legal impediments to diffusion of artificial
insemination).
19. The Children Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA), which was enacted
in 1999 to protect children's privacy on the Internet, is an example of an early
legislative intervention. See Children Online Privacy Protection Act, 47 U.S.C.
§ 231 (2005). For examples of early judicial regulations of the Internet, see Main-
stream Loudoun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Loudoun County Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783
(E.D. Va. 1998); Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 N.Y. Misc. Lexis
229 (N.Y. Misc. 1995). Whether intervention should be considered early interven-
tion is also dependent on the technology's rate of diffusion. Where a technology is
still used by early adopters an intervention could be considered to be early even if
a court ruling takes place twenty years after a technology started diffusing. For a
typology of users through a technology's diffusion process, see EvERETTr M. Roc-
ERS, DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 279-86 (5th ed. 2003).
20. See ROGER B. DwORKIN, THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN BIOETHICAL DECISION
MAKING 12-13 (1996); Lyria Bennett Moses, Understanding Legal Responses to Techno-
logical Change: The Example of In Vitro Fertilization, 6 MINN. J.L. ScI. & TECH. 505
(2005).
21. See Blake T. Bilstad, Obscenity and Indecency in a Digital Age: The Legal and
Political Implications of Cybersmut, Virtual Pornography, and the Communications Decency
Act of 1996, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 321 (1997); Brown, supra
note 2; Cate, supra note 2; Sally Greenberg, Threats, Harassment and Hate On-Line:
Recent Developments, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 673 (1997); Jane Kaufman Winn, Open
Systems, Free Markets and Regulation of Internet Commerce, 72 TUL. L. REv. 1177 (1998);
Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1744-45 (1995); Byron F.
Marchant, On-Line on the Internet: First Amendment and Intellectual Property Uncertain-
ties in the On-Line World, 39 How. L.J. 477 (1996); Paul K. Ohm, On Regulating the
Internet: Usenet, a Case Study, 46 UCLA L. REv. 1941, 1987 (1999). For an overview
of the early approach toward privacy on the Internet, see Peter P. Swire, Trustwrap:
The Importance of Legal Rules to Electronic Commerce and Internet Privacy, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 847, 859-62 (2003); see also President Clinton, A Framework for Global Electronic
Commerce (July 1, 1997), http://www.technology.gov/digeconomy/framework.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2006).
2006]
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progress promotes human welfare. 22 The corollary of this belief is the
conviction that intervention with scientific and technological discoveries
before their full effects and ramifications are realized could impede
human progress.2 3 There is often a large gap between the originally envi-
sioned use for a technology and how the technology is eventually used.24
Early intervention could preclude important opportunities. The tele-
phone, for example, was promoted and used at first only as a business tool.
The notion that the telephone could be used for social purposes was
unimaginable, even by the phone companies marketing the invention.
Private individuals-the users-transformed the early-envisioned role of
the telephone and turned it into a social tool.2 5 A more recent example is
the Internet. The Internet started in the 1960s as a research network in
universities. It is the prime example of users transforming the technology
and its uses; users' choices turned it into the Internet we know today. 26
B. Toward Social Shaping
The concept of "intervention" is frequently used to describe legal reg-
ulation of social behavior. "Intervention" is used in a vast array of legal
fields from contracts law to cyberspace law.27 Its use is not limited to de-
picting situations where legal action acts to transform society. The term
"legal intervention" is used often even in contexts where the law is consid-
ered to be enforcing existing social values, norms and structures. 28 I seek
22. See generally Christopher Lasch, The True and Only Heaven: Progress and
Its Critics 4144 (1991). Although the belief in progress as a source of prosperity
for mankind is not necessarily held by all, it remains a dominant social theme. For
skeptical views of the notion of progress as promoting human welfare, see LASCH,
supra; Leo Marx, Does Improved Technology Mean Progress? in TECHNOLOGY AND THE
FUTURE (Albert H. Heich ed., 2006).
23. See DAVID COLLINGRIDGE, THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF TECHNOLOGY (1980)
(developing decision-making theory to address difficulty of deciding before tech-
nology's full ramifications are known).
24. Arie Rip and Johan W. Schot, Identifying Loci for Influencing the Dynamics of
Technological Development, in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY, GUIDING POLICY. CONCEPTS,
SPACES AND TOOLS 155, 156 (Knut H. Sorensen & Robin Williams eds., 2002).
25. See Claude Fischer, The Telephone Industry Discovers Sociability, in TECHNOL-
OGY AND CHOICE: READINGS FROM TECHNOLOGY AND CULTURE (Marcel C. Lafollette
&Jeffrey K. Stine eds., 1991).
26. For a description of the early days of the Internet, see generally, TIM
BERNERS-LEE, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB
BY ITS INVENTOR (1999); JAMES GILLIES & ROBERT CAILLIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS
BORN: THE STORY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB (2000).
27. Examples of articles describing legal action as legal intervention are ubiq-
uitous. This terminology is particularly prevalent in law and social norms litera-
ture. For some examples, see Daniel Benoliel, Technological Standards, Inc.:
Rethinking Cyberspace Regulatory Epistemology, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1069 (2004); David
Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARv. L. REv. 375, 426-66
(1990); Sarah E. Waldeck, Using Male Circumcision to Understand Social Norms as Mul-
tipliers, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 455, 499-526 (2003).
28. See Robert Post, Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 485
(2003).
928 [Vol. 51: p. 921
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here to replace the term "legal intervention" with the term "social shap-
ing," because I believe that in the context of the regulation of new tech-
nologies its use is particularly detrimental.
First, the use of the term intervention in the context of the regulation
of new technologies assumes a notion of technological determinism.
Technological determinism is the view of technology as an autonomous
entity that develops according to an internal logic and direction of its own,
resulting in determinate impacts on society.29 In other words, under the
technological determinism approach, a given technology has a fixed track
of evolution dictated by technological constraints and, therefore, its uses
and societal effects are predestined and unchangeable. At the same time,
social shaping, a term coined by the social constructivist movement in sci-
ence and technology studies, embodies a different view of technological
evolution. 30 Proponents of social shaping see technology as "a cause" but
not "the cause" of the ensuing social effects. 3 1 The social ramifications of
a technology are not predetermined by the technology itself, but are re-
sponsive to social reforms that seek to make the innovation compatible
with social structures and values.3 2 Furthermore, social shaping of a tech-
nology is conceived as an interactive process between the technology and
its users and not as a top-down process. 33
The term intervention presupposes technological determinism 3 4 be-
cause it refers to a change of what would otherwise be a natural course. 35
If one recognizes, as many legal scholars writing on law and technology
29. See generally HEBERT MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN (1964); Jacques El-
lul, The Technological Order, in PHILOSOPHY AND TECHNOLOGY. READINGS IN THE PHIL,
OSOPHICAL PROBLEMS OF TECHNOLOGY 86 (1972). For a rejection of the
technological deterministic view, see DAVID ELLIOTr & RUTH ELLIOTT, THE CON-
TROL OF TECHNOLOGY 5-6 (1976).
30. The term was said to be coined by Donald McKenzie and Judie Wajcman
in the title of their 1985 reader "The Social Shaping of Technology: How the Re-
frigerator Got Its Hum." See DONALD MACKENZIE &J. WAJCMAN, THE SOCIAL SHAP-
ING OF TECHNOLOGY: How THE REFRIGERATOR GOT ITS HUM (1985); Knut H.
Sorensen, Social Shaping on the Move? On the Policy Relevance of the Social Shaping of
Technology Perspective, in SHAPING TECHNOLOGY, GUIDING POLICY: CONCEPTS, SPACES
AND TooLs 19, 20 (Knut H. Sorensen & Robin Williams eds., 2002).
31. See generally WILLIAM B. THOMPSON, CONTROLLING TECHNOLOGY: CONTEM-
PORARY ISSUES (1991).
32. See Robert Heilbroner, Do Machines Make History, in CONTROLLING TECH-
NOLOGY 213, 219-20 (William B. Thompson ed., 1991);John Law & Michel Callon,
The Life and Death of an Aircraft: A Network Analysis of Technical Change, in SHAPING
TECHNOLOGY/BUILDING SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE 21 (Wiebe
E. Bijker &John Law eds., 1992); Russell & Williams, supra note 11, at 39.
33. See BIJKER, supra note 11, at 45-50 (explaining role of "relevant social
groups" in social shaping of technology).
34. Even proponents of technological determinism acknowledged that
human intervention is possible. See Langdon Winner, The Enduring Dilemmas of
Autonomous Technique, 15 BULL. OF ScI., TECH. AND SoC'Y 67 (1995).
35. The Oxford English Dictionary defines "intervention" as: "the action of
intervening, 'stepping in' or interfering in any affair, so as to affect its course or
issue" (highlight added). THE OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).
2006] 929
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do, that the choices we make regarding technologies matter because they
can result in different social effects, then the use of the term intervention
appears unsuitable.3 6 Furthermore, the notion of technological innova-
tion is also closely intertwined with the quest for progress. Following
World War II, many countries adopted a technology policy framework that
focused on promoting science and technology in order to drive economic
growth. Technological progress became synonymous with social progress
and technological change was perceived as the major driver of social
change. 3 7 If technology is synonymous with progress, then an interven-
tion with the natural course of events becomes an obstacle to achieving
progress and human flourishing. Consequently, intervention, particularly
early intervention, should be treated with great caution. Once we replace
the notion of an intervention that transforms the natural course of events
with the concept of social shaping that channels technology into one of
several possible routes, however, the question of when should we shape
technology to achieve the most effective result becomes less threatening.
A second reason to replace the term intervention with the concept of
social shaping is that this would place shaping through technology and
shaping through law on equal grounds with regard to our perception of
the intrusiveness of the act. Legal scholars have been debating extensively
the efficacy of regulation through technology (through code) versus regu-
lation through law. 3 3 I do not seek to enter this debate but, instead, to
emphasize one aspect in which the two modes of regulation share a similar
trait. Both shape technology in the sense that they do not intervene with a
predetermined route. Yet, regulating technology through technological
measures is often referred to as "design," while legal regulation is con-
36. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler discussing the regulation of wireless
communications:
We are in the process today of making a fundamental choice about how
we will communicate with each other in the next century .... The deci-
sion to be made is deceptively "technical": how to regulate that part of the
digitally networked environment that utilizes wireless or radio-communi-
cations technology.... The choice we make among these alternatives will
determine the path of development of our wireless communications in-
frastructure. Its social, political, and cultural implications are likely to be
profound.
Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agrophobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally
Networked Environment, 11 HARv.J.L. & TECH 287, 290 (1998); see also, Jay P. Kesan
& Rajiv C. Shah, Deconstructing Code, 6 YALEJ. L. & TECH. 279 (2003/2004) (adopt-
ing social shaping approach to technological design).
37. Russell & Williams, supra note 11, at 136.
38. SeeJulie Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575 (2003);
David R. Johnson, Susan P. Crawford & John G. Palfrey, The Accountable Internet:
Peer Production of Internet Governance, 9 VA.J.L. & TECH. 9 (2004); Sonia M. Katyal,
The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. Rs. L. REv. 297 (2003); Mark Lemley, The Law &
Economics of Internet Norms, 73 CHI.-KENT. L. REv. 1257 (1998); Henry Perritt, To-
wards a Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215; Joel
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Through Technology,
76 TEX. L. REv. 553 (1998); E. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L.
REv'. 457 (2005); Tim Wu, ihen Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. RFV. 679 (2003).
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ceived as "intervention."39 Consequently, legal action is more likely to be
perceived as interference than technological action. Applying the term
social shaping to both regulation through law and regulation through
technology underscores that both act to channel technology towards one
of several potential ways that can reflect different social values. Hence,
neither is intrusive in the sense that it disrupts the natural progression of
the technology.
III. UNPACKING EARLY SOCIAL SHAPING: COMMERCIAL NON-PRIVACY
NoRMs ON THE INTERNET
Recent technological advances have intensified the debate over the
advisability of early social shaping. In this Part, I seek to depolarize the
debate regarding early social shaping of new technologies by engaging in
a system analysis of Internet technology with regard to the collection of
personal information on the Internet by commercial entities. I believe the
breadth of the data available on Internet commercial privacy norms makes
the phenomenon particularly suitable as a starting point for addressing
the question of when social shaping should occur. The Internet privacy
threat first entered public debate in 2000. Since then different social
shaping measures were tested and ample empirical data is available to eval-
uate their effectiveness.
I begin by discussing the polarization of the early shaping debate. I
proceed to describe the rapid entrenchment of commercial non-privacy
norms on the Internet. I then turn to identify three technological charac-
teristics of the Internet: (i) its critical mass point quality (and related net-
work effects); (ii) its decentralized diffusion process; and (iii) its
enablement of concealed monitoring. I point out that all three character-
istics contributed to the rapid entrenchment of commercial non-privacy
norms.
A. The Polarized Early Social Shaping Debate
The debate regarding the desirability of early social shaping has been
intensified by the implication of certain technologies, such as stem cell
research in the political abortion debate. 40 The political association po-
larized the debate and the answer to whether early social shaping through
banning or limiting research is desirable increasingly became a "yes" or
"no" answer. My objective here is not to advocate for early social shaping
but to take the issue out of its contentious place and to endeavor to un-
39. For writers referring to shaping technological uses through technological
measures as "design, " see generally Dan L. Burk, Legal and Technical Standards in
Digital Rights Management Technology, 74 FoRDAM L. REV. 537 (2005); Nimrod
Kozlovski, A Paradigm Shift in Online Policing: Designing Accountable Policing (2005)
(unpublished JS.D. Dissertation, Yale Law School), http://crypto.stanford.edu/portia; Beth
Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L. J. 433 (2004).
40. See Janet Dolgin, Embryonic Discourse: Abortion, Stem Cells and Cloning, 19
ISSUES L. & MED. 203 (2004); Saunders, supra note 3.
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pack the question of timing. I would like to pose the question, when does
timing become of the essence for the social shaping of new technologies?
The question is particularly pertinent in the context of privacy. Through-
out history, new technologies have destabilized the value of privacy. These
privacy controversies involved diverse technologies, such as the camera,
computer databases and genetics testing. Yet, these controversies varied
not only with regard to their technological subject matter but also with
regard to the reaction times to the privacy threat.41
B. Commercial Non-Privacy Norms on the Internet
As the Internet became increasingly popular, web sites and commer-
cial profiling companies began collecting personal information. Their
goal was to target advertising to Internet users and sometimes to transform
sites to match users' interests and socio-economic status. Web sites and
commercial profiling companies collected personal information, such as
names, email addresses, web searches conducted and sites visited through
a variety of technological devices, primarily cookies, spyware and web
bugs. 4
2
The Internet privacy threat came into public awareness in 1999-
2000.13 Since then efforts at social shaping were based mainly on self-
regulation through privacy notices, privacy seals and through technologi-
cal measures. 44 Yet, a survey I conducted of empirical studies of the cur-
rent state of collection practices on the Internet demonstrated an overall
increase of privacy-threatening technological devices. We currently have
41. See FREEDMAN, supra note 5, at 93-112; RAYMOND WACES, PERSONAL INFOR-
MATION: PRIVACY AND THE LAW 178-301 (1989); Brandeis & Warren, supra note 5.
42. See WEB STREET STUDIOS, COOKIE BASICS, http://www.webstreetstudios.
com/school/cookies.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2006); MICROsOFr CORP, UNDER-
STANDING COOKIES, http://www.microsoft.com/resources/documentation/win-
dows/xp/all/proddocs/en-us/seccook.mspx (last visited Mar. 17, 2006); CENTER
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, GHOSTS IN OUR MACHINES: BACKGROUND AND POL-
ICY PROPOSALS ON THE "SPYW'ARE" PROBLEM (Nov. 2003), http://www.cdt.org/pri-
vacy/03110spyware.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2006); David Martin & Hailin Wu,
Hidden Surveillance by Web Sites: Web Bugs in Contemporary Use 46(12); COMMUNICA-
TIONS OF THE ACM 259, 260 (2003); CYVEILLANCE WHITE PAPER, WEB BUGS: A STUDY
OF THE PRESENCE AND GROWTH RATE OF WEB BUGS ON THE INTERNET 2-3 (2001),
http://www.cyveillance.com/web/corporate/white-papers.htm (last visited Mar.
17, 2006) [hereinafter Cyveillance White Paper]. For a description of the formation
of non-privacy norms on the Internet, see STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED
WORLD 245, 250, 274 (2004).
43. See, e.g., Amid Protests, supra note 12, at 13 (reporting on commercial pro-
filing company Doubleclick's intention to incorporate online information with of-
fline database).
44. For a discussion of privacy policies, see THE PROGRESS AND FREEDOM FOUN-
DATION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT ON THE INFORMATION PRACTICES AND POLICIES
OF COMMERCIAL WEB-SITES (2002). For a discussion of privacy seal organizations,
see ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, ONLINE PROFILING PROJECT, COM-
MENT, P994809/DoCKET 990811219-9219-01 (1999), http://www.epic.org/privacy/
internet/profiling-reply-comment.PDF (last visited Mar. 17, 2006) [hereinafter
Epic, Online Profiling Project].
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more cookies, spyware and web bugs than before.4 5 The empirical studies
reveal that use of privacy threatening technological devices has become
routine among websites and commercial profiling companies on the
Internet.
While commercial practices are generally motivated by the desire to
achieve financial gain, they can be simultaneously motivated by social
norms. 46 Social norms include behavioral patterns relying on conformity
that is not necessarily derived from a sense of obligation or normative
meaning. 47 At this point, websites and commercial profiling companies
have an incentive to conform to each other's behavior. 48 A website unilat-
erally selecting to cease collecting personal information will be signifi-
candy disadvantaged with respect to its competitors who continue to rely
on the information for purposes of targeted marketing. In addition, web-
sites have an incentive to assure that other websites maintain their infor-
mation collection practices. Commercial profiling becomes effective as
information is collected across web-sites. Commercial profiling companies
converge information collected from different websites and provide their
website clientele with profiles based on this combined information. A sig-
nificant reduction in the number of participants would be detrimental to
the usefulness of the practice. Finally, websites have an incentive to assure
that other commercial users maintain the stealthy nature of the collection
in order to prevent public outrage and potential lawsuits. Consequently,
not only do websites have no incentive to change their behavior, they also
have an incentive to encourage others not to change the nature of their
information collection practices. It appears that the use of privacy threat-
ening tools, such as cookies, web bugs or spyware has become an en-
trenched social norm among the Internet's commercial users.
C. Internet Technology - A System Analysis
The question becomes, what caused the rapid entrenchment of non-
privacy norms? Three technological characteristics of the Internet appear
to be at the crux of the fast diffusion of non-privacy norms. These charac-
teristics are: (i) the Internet's critical mass point quality (and related net-
45. See Bernstein, supra note 7.
46. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, COLUM. L. REv.,
1253, 1253, 1283-87 (1999) (discussing institutional investors' participation
norms); see alsoJody S. Kraus, Legal Design and the Evolution of Commercial Norms, 26
J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (1997) (stating that commercial norms will only develop if they
provide merchants with on average more cost-effective method of adopting com-
mercial practices). For an example of commercial practices described as social
norms, see Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating
Cooperation Through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REv. 1724 (2001).
47. See HETCHER, supra note 42, at 1, 18, 30; Eisenberg, supra note 46, at 1256-
57; Steven Hetcher, Changing the Social Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15 HARVJ.
L. & TECH. 149, 153-56 (2001) (distinguishing between traditional rule conception
of norms and pattern conception of norms).
48. See HETCHER, supra note 42, at 247-50.
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work effects); (ii) the Internet's decentralized diffusion process; and (iii)
the concealed nature of the privacy threat imposed by the Internet.
1. Critical Mass Point
Interactive technologies are often characterized by "network effects."
Network effects exist in markets where the value an individual places on a
good increases as others use the good. For example, the telephone be-
came more useful and desirable as more people had it and an individual
who owned a telephone had more people to call. 49 Network effects be-
come significant once a critical mass of individuals has adopted a technol-
ogy to make its use worthwhile.
Network effects particularly influence diffusion once critical mass is
reached.50 First, once a technology reaches the critical mass point, its rate
of diffusion accelerates. 5 1 Consequently, where critical mass is attained,
technological structures and related norms are rapidly diffused. Second,
when critical mass is reached, the dependence on the technology reduces
the likelihood of abandonment because the costs of abandonment are in-
creased to unacceptable levels.5 2 For example, in 2006, it is more costly
for an individual to stop using email unilaterally than it was for her coun-
terpart ten years earlier. Hence, where an interactive technology reaches
the critical mass point, existing technological structures and related norms
are less likely to be abandoned.
The Internet is considered a network effects technology. The value of
the Internet is a function of the number of people who are connected to
it.5 3 The Internet reached its critical mass point in 1990 with four million
49. See Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Net-
work Externalities, 94J. POL. ECON. 822, 822-23 (1986); Mark Lemley & David Mc-
Gowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 481, 483
(1998).
50. Another important characteristic of network effect technologies that be-
comes significant once critical mass is reached is the nature of the demand curve.
Goods that do not have network effects have demand curves that slope downwards,
that is, as price decreases more of the good is demanded. Goods that have net-
work effects, however, feature a different demand curve. The willingness of indi-
viduals to pay for the good increases as the number of goods expected to be sold
grows, therefore, price may increase instead of decreasing. See Nicholas
Economidas & Charles Himmelberg, Critical Mass and Network Size with Application
to the US Fax Market, Discussion Paper No. EC-95-1 1, Stern School of Business, N.Y.U.,
http://raven.stem.nyu.edu/networks/95-1l.pdf (last visited May 12, 2006). It
should be noted, however, that the presumed increasing returns might not be the
only effects at work, because other preferences may eventually also affect choices.
See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 49, at 497.
51. See ROGERS, supra note 19, at 343-45; M. Lynne Markus, Toward a "Critical
Mass" Theory of Interactive Media, in ORGANIZATIONS AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOL-
OGY 194 (Janet Fulk & Charles Steinfield eds., 1990); Nicholas Economides, The
Economics of Networks, INT'L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 27 (Oct. 1996), available at http://
www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/site.html (last visited May 27, 2006).
52. See ROGERS, supra note 19, at 343-45; M. Lynne Markus, supra note 51.
53. See Lemley, supra note 38, at 1281.
[Vol. 51: p. 921
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss4/8
WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES ARE STILL NEW
users worldwide. Commercialization and the growth in the number of
commercial users closely followed rapid popular diffusion.5 4 Privacy
threatening technologies appeared at a period of rapid diffusion and the
accompanying non-privacy commercial norms were quickly entrenched.
55
Furthermore, by 2000, the Internet became an integral part of our lives. 56
Consequently a change in non-privacy norms imposed through the threat
of abandonment became less likely as abandonment became less
plausible.
2. Decentralization
A second major characteristic of the Internet-its decentralized na-
ture-also contributed to the rapid entrenchment of non-privacy norms.
Decentralized innovations are not controlled by a group of experts. In-
stead, they are spread horizontally among users. Furthermore, decentrali-
zation is not limited to the technology's diffusion. The ability to re-invent
or re-design the technology is also decentralized and available to users. 57
The Internet is, in fact, the archetype of a decentralized innovation-its
development has historically relied on its users. 58 When the rapidly in-
creasing number of commercial Internet entities discovered the potential
for collecting personal information, they were easily able to develop In-
ternet technology to conform to these needs. The ability of individual
commercial actors to incorporate privacy-threatening tools, such as cook-
ies, within the developing Internet architecture exacerbated the quick en-
trenchment of non-privacy norms.
54. See ROGERS, supra note 19, at 34344, 346.
55. Mark Lemley cautioned as early as 1998 that norms built around techno-
logical structures in a network market are likely to prove quite durable. See Lem-
ley, supra note 38, at 1283-84.
56. A study conducted in 2000 demonstrated the extent to which the Internet
had become integral to everyday life. The study surveyed Internet users and
showed that 91% used email, 47% purchased products online, 36% made travel
reservations online, 60% read news online, 54% searched health information on-
line, 38% looked for a job online, 36% made travel reservations online, 17% en-
gaged in online banking, 36% listened or downloaded music, 35% played online
games and 28% participated in chat rooms. See PEW INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE
PROJECT, NEW INTERNET USERS: WHAT THEY Do ONLINE, WHAT THEY DON'T, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE NET'S FUTURE (2000), http://www.pewinternet.org (last Vis-
ited Mar. 17, 2006).
57. See ROGERS, supra note 19, at 180, 394-98; DUNCANJ. WATTS, Six DEGREES:
THE SCIENCE OF A CONNECTED AGE 50-55 (2003); Brian S. Butler & Deborah E.
Gibbons, Power Distribution as a Catalyst and Consequence of Decentralized Technology
Diffusion, in INFORMATION SYSTEM AND TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND DIFFUSION
(McGuire & T. Larsen eds., 1997).
58. See Steven R. Salbu, Who Should Govern the Internet? Monitoring and Support-
ing a New Frontie, 11 IHARv J.L. & TECH. 429, 435 (1998); Lawrence B. Solum &
Minn Chung, The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 815, 832 (2004).
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3. Concealed Monitoring
The Internet possesses a third characteristic that particularly affects
individuals' perception of the privacy threat. Individuals are unaware of
the privacy threat because cookies, spyware and web bugs are invisible.
Even when Internet users are knowledgeable about Internet information
collection practices, the concealed nature of the monitoring dilutes the
perception of a threat.59 Consequently, Internet users have been reluc-
tant to adopt technological measures, such as the Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P), that can protect their privacy on the Internet. 60 The
invisibility of the privacy threat made individuals less likely to undertake
measures to protect their privacy.
61
Although privacy has been traditionally protected as an individual
right, a number of writers have pointed out that it also possesses the quali-
ties of a public value. In other words, privacy is important not only to the
individual but also to society as a whole. In particular, privacy contributes
to a well-functioning democracy. 62 Recently, Paul Schwartz has taken the
point further by describing privacy as a public good that benefits society as
a whole and cannot be created through an unregulated market. He refers
to the privacy public good as "the privacy commons," which requires main-
tenance through social and legal controls.
6 3
The invisibility of the privacy threat underscores the growing need for
concerted, instead of individual action, to protect privacy. Devices that
59. For studies examining Internet users' awareness of the privacy threat, see
Alan F. Westin, Social and Political Dimensions of Privacy, 59(2) J. Soc. ISSUES, 445,
445-46 (2003); Epic, Online Profiling Project, supra note 44; PEW INTERNET & AMERI-
CAN LIFE PROJECT, TRUST AND PRIVACY ONLINE: WHY AMERICANS WANT TO REWRITE
THE RULES 7 (2000), http://www.pewinternet.org (last visited Mar. 17, 2006).
60. S. REP. No. 2201, at 11-12 (2002); MICROSOFT CORP., MICROSOFT P3P IM-
PLEMENTATION SHEET, supra note 9; ERNST & YOUNG, ENABLING P3P, supra note 9;
ERNST & YOUNG, SECURITYSPACE, supra note 9. A potential exception is the adop-
tion of anti-spyware software protection. Yet, spyware not only collects personal
information, it also disrupts the computer's normal function and its online com-
munications. Hence, user willingness to adopt anti-spyware technology does not,
in fact, reflect a reaction to the privacy threat. See CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH-
NOLOGY, supra note 42, at 3; see also Bob Tedeschi, Spyware Heats Up the Debate over
Cookies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2005, at C3. An additional factor that contributed to
the failure of the P3P was the inability of Internet users who selected high privacy
preferences to use many websites. Websites obstruct entry of users who reject
cookies. The limitations and cumbersome interaction likely inhibited even the few
users who initially elected to use P3P.
61. See James P Nehf, Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78
WASH L. REv. 1, 62 (2003); Malla Pollack, Opt-In Government: Using the Internet to
Empower Choice - Privacy Application, 50 CATH. U. L. REv. 653, 669-71 (2001).
62. For discussion of privacy as a public value, see PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGIS-
LATING PRIVACY 225-27 (1995); Nehf, supra note 61, at 1; Robert Post, The Social
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV.
957 (1989); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REv.
1607 (1999).
63. See Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy and Personal Data, HARv. L. REV.
2055, 2079, 2087-89 (2004).
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monitor individuals and threaten their privacy have become increasingly
concealed. One example is the shift from cameras to cell-phone cameras
that can be clandestinely used. 6 4 Other devices are even more invisible,
such as Global Positioning Systems that are being installed in cars and cell
phones.6 5 Yet, the effect of the increasingly invisible nature of the privacy
threat on individuals' willingness to assert their privacy rights can be seen
most starkly in the context of the Internet. The effect is more discernible
because on the Internet, individuals have an array of technological options
to protect their privacy that do not exist in other contexts.6 6 Yet, Internet
users overall do not adopt these options.6 7 It appears that the absence of
a perceptible threat makes individuals less likely to act to protect their
privacy, contributing to the shift of privacy from a private right to a public
value.
The transformation of privacy into a public value sheds additional
light on the fast entrenchment of non-privacy norms. As individual users
lacked the incentives to act to protect their privacy online, the design of
Internet architecture was left to the privacy preferences of commercial ac-
tors. These actors embedded the Internet's architecture with privacy
threatening technologies that lead to the prevalence of commercial non-
privacy norms.
IV. WHY DOES TIME BECOME OF THE ESSENCE?
The previous Part examined the technological characteristics of the
Internet that led to the rapid entrenchment of non-privacy norms. In this
Part, I suggest that where a technology's characteristics are likely to cause
a fast entrenchment of non-privacy norms, decision-makers should pay
particular heed to the issue of timing. My conclusion is supported by in-
sights from several fields: (i) the economic theory of Path Dependence;
(ii) the science and technology studies theory of Closure; and (iii) law and
social norms theory.
64. See Phone Spies Sneak Peeks; Cell Phone Cameras Pose Threat to Privacy, BOSTON
HERALD, July 10, 2003, at 1; Susan Kuczka, Photo Phones Dial Up Concerns on Privacy;
More Towns, Businesses Make Camera Gadgets Off-Limits in Sensitive Locations, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Feb. 25, 2004, at Cl.
65. See PRIVACY RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE, WHEN A CELL PHONE Is MORE THAN A
PHONE: PROTECTING YOUR PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF THE SUPER-PHONE (2005), http://
www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs2b-cellprivacy.htm (last visited May 27, 2006); Davis D.
Janowski, SiRF GPS Chipsets Your Son's Out Late, Not Answering His Phone, PC MAGA-
ZINE, Dec. 21, 2005;Joni Morse, GPS the Ne-west Tool for Fighting Crime, RCR WIRELESS
NEWS, Oct. 24, 2005; Wireless Management to Triple, FLEET OWNER, Dec. 1, 2005, at
73.
66. See generally ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, Epic ONLINE GUIDE
TO PRACTICAL PRIVACY TooLs (2006), http://www.epic.org/privacy/tools.html (list-
ing privacy enhancing technologies that include: anonymous remailers; anony-
mous surfing tools; cookie busters; encryption devices; and firewalls).
67. For an extensive discussion of the empirical evidence pointing to the fail-
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More specifically, in the case of commercial privacy norms on the In-
ternet, the law has proclaimed that commercial profiling on the Internet
does not amount to a privacy violation. 68 Similarly, efforts at self-regula-
tion and reactive technological shaping that focused on the individual
user have proven ineffective. The theoretical insights derived from the
concepts of path dependence, closure and law and social norms studies
shed light on the increased difficulties of changing Internet commercial
privacy norms at the point when norms have already become entrenched.
Thus, these insights underscore the need to consider early shaping to pro-
tect privacy where technologies have a critical mass point quality, are de-
centralized and enable concealed monitoring.
A. Path Dependence
Path dependence, broadly defined, refers to the ways in which the
path or the way things are done today is affected by the path or choices
that were initially selected in the past.69 For example, we drive a car down
a curving road and wonder why it winds around when it is obvious from
the landscape topography that a straight road could have been built and
would have been much easier to drive. Yet, the road was built decades ago
and the authorities are unlikely to raze the houses and commercial estab-
lishments built around it to build a straight road even if it should have
been done that way in the first place. 70
Several explanations are offered to account for our dependency on
existing paths. First, efficiency and sunk adaptive costs are used to explain
path dependence. Where the investments of building the path and creat-
68. See In re Pharmatrak, Inc. Privacy Litigation, 329 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2003); In
re Toys R Us, Inc. Privacy Litigation, No. 00-CV-2746, 2001 WL 34517252 (N.D. Cal.
Oct. 9, 2001); In re DoubleClick Inc. Privacy Litigation, 154 F. Supp. 2d 497
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Chance v. Ave. A, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1153 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
Nevertheless, some restrictions relating mainly to collection of personally identifi-
able information were imposed by FTC and state settlement agreements. See
Agreement Between the Attorneys General of the States of Arizona, California,
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ver-
mont, and Washington and DoubleClick, Inc. (Aug. 26, 2002), http://www.oag.
state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug26a -02-attach.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2006); Of-
ficial Ct. Notice of Settlement In re DoubleClick, Inc. Privacy Litig., Master File
No. 00-CIV-0641 (NRB) (Mar. 29, 2002), http://www.epic.org/privacy/intemet/
cookies/dblclkproposedsettlement.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2006). In addition, use
of spyware has prompted some restrictive legislation and case law. Yet, these pro-
tections are not primarily focused on privacy interests but on other spyware harms,
such as computer malfunction. See CAL Bus. & PROF CODE § 22947 (2005); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 13-40-102 (2005); Washington Post et al. v. The Gator Corporation,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20879 (E.D. Va. 2002); Hearings on The Spy Act H.R 29, Before
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce on Combating Spyware, 108th Cong.
(2004).
69. The literature differentiates between two types of path dependence: struc-
ture driven path dependence and rule driven path dependence. I refer to struc-
ture driven path dependence. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 10, at 129.
70. See Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 HA-,v. L.
REV. 641, 643 (1996).
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ing the related resources along the path have already been expended, it
may be more efficient to keep the existing path than to build a new one.
7 1
The inefficiency of the existing path is insufficient tojustify creating a new
one after comparing the expenses for improving the old structure versus
creating a new one. Second, the actors who are motivated to induce
change may be ineffective in influencing public choice. This is often the
case where existing structures strengthened the influence of the actors
who are benefiting from them. 72 Third, information may be unavailable
regarding the alternative primarily because imagining the alternative path
clashes with the path induced perception that consists of the normal state
of affairs. 73
The concept of path dependence has been primarily used in corpo-
rate law literature.74 Yet, technologies are also, at times, captured by path
dependence. Particularly compelling is the story of path dependence evi-
denced in current computer keyboard design. The computer keyboard
design used by most computer users is called QWERTY. QWERTY is, in
fact, believed by many to be a sub-optimal keyboard design. 75 Its arrange-
ment of keys was selected to deal with an ancient technological problem-
the clashing of type bars on the typewriter-a problem solved by the nine-
teenth- entury. DVORAK, a keyboard design that enables more effective
typing, was invented in 1932. Were we to choose between the two key-
boards today, without past adaptive sunken costs, we would most likely se-
lect the DVORAK keyboard. Yet, users reluctant to adjust to a new typing
method declined to adopt the DVORAK path. The preferences of existing
users repeatedly outweighed those of new users for whom it would have
been more efficient to adopt the DVORAK design.76
Similarly, a proposed change of the commercial non-privacy norms,
currently dominating the Internet, would be challenged by the forces of
path dependence. A large number of commercial actors on the Internet
are dependent on the concerted and concealed collection of personal in-
formation. A potential switch to an alternative path with different privacy
71. See Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 10, at 137.
72. See Roe, supra note 70, at 650.
73. Id.
74. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate
Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U.L.Q.
347 (1996); Frederick W. Lambert, Path Dependent Inefficiency in the Corporate Con-
tract: The Uncertain Case with Less Certain Implications, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1077
(1998); RonaldJ. Mann & CurtisJ. Milhaupt, Path Dependence and Comparative Cor-
porate Governance: Forward, 74 WASH. U.L.Q 317 (1996).
75. For an explanation and history of the DVORAK keyboard, see The
DVORAK Keyboard, http://www.mit.edu/-jcb/Dvorak/.
76. See Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75:2 AM. ECON. REV.
332 (1985); Clayton P. Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV.
813, 817 (1998). But see S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys,
XXXIII J.L. & ECON. Apr. 1990, available at http://wwwpub.utdallas.edu/
-liebowit/keysl.html (last visited May 13, 2006) (arguing that use of QWERTY key-
board is efficient and that Dvorak keyboard was justifiably rejected).
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norms that restrict the collection of personal information is likely to be
inefficient for the Internet's commercial users.
In addition, the Internet's commercial users, websites and commer-
cial profiling companies that engage in non-privacy norms are significantly
more motivated and powerful than individual users in influencing public
choice regarding information collection. The individual users, who would
benefit from a change in the commercial non-privacy norms, remain rela-
tively passive with regard to the collection of their personal information.
Surveys show that, when asked, Internet users vehemently oppose the col-
lection of personal information by commercial actors on the Internet.
77
Yet, the surveys also reveal that Internet users are only partially aware of
the scope of these practices. 78 Furthermore, as discussed, the invisibility
of the monitoring reduces the likelihood that individuals will react to the
privacy threat because they are not aware of it on a daily basis. The invisi-
ble nature of Internet monitoring also affects the existing universe of in-
formation. The concealed privacy threat affects individual users' ability to
appreciate the extent to which a change in privacy norms is needed and to
imagine a potential new privacy path. Consequently, individual users are
less likely to take the necessary steps to influence public choice and trans-
form existing Internet architecture toward a more privacy enhancing one.
Moreover, Internet technology's vulnerability to path dependence is
not solely an indirect result of the technological characteristics that pro-
duced the rapid entrenchment of norms. The Internet's susceptibility to
path dependence is also a direct consequence of its critical mass point and
decentralized qualities. Where a technology is standardized, a shift to an
improved standard is less likely because a single user is unlikely to shift to
a new system without assurances that a critical mass of potential users will
follow suit. If a centralized authority that governs the technology exists, it
may enforce such a shift and thereby allay fears that other users will not
move to the alternative system. 79
Internet users, whether individual or commercial, are highly depen-
dent on each other and are unlikely to shift unilaterally to an alternative
path. The Internet's commercial users are dependent on concealed tech-
nological devices that are effective through sharing information across
websites. Even a major commercial website is likely to abandon existing
practices without assurances that a significant number of other commer-
cial users would follow. Individual users face a similar quandary. Users
who try independently to maintain their privacy, for example, by rejecting
cookies find themselves unable to access websites that utilize cookies. The
77. See Federal Trade Commission, Online Profiling: A Report to Congress, 15-16
(2000) [hereinafter, FTC, Report to Congress]; Mary Madden, Americans' Online Pur-
suits, at *5 (2003), http://www.pewintemet.org [hereinafter Pew, Online Pursuits].
78. See THE PRIVACYPLACE.ORG, 2002 INTERNET PRIVACY USER VALUES SURVEY
(2002), http://william.stufflebeam.cc/privacySurvey/results/resultsPage.php;
FTC, Report to Congress, supra note 77, at 11-12.
79. Gillette, supra note 76, at 817.
[Vol. 51: p. 921
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 51, Iss. 4 [2006], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol51/iss4/8
WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES ARE STILL NEW
standardized use of privacy-threatening technological device prevents
them from unilaterally protecting their privacy. Further, the Internet lacks
a centralized authority that could dictate a shift by commercial or individ-
ual users to alternative paths. For instance, a centralized authority's assur-
ance that a significant number of users will concertedly reject cookies
could influence websites privacy norms. Websites are unlikely to turn away
a large number of customers because their browsers reject cookies. Yet, in
the absence of such an authority, individual efforts to combat standardiza-
tion are less likely to succeed. Hence, the critical mass point quality and
decentralization make the Internet particularly vulnerable to the effects of
path dependence.
B. Closure
Closure is a concept that was coined by the Social Shaping of Tech-
nology (SST) movement. Closure is the point by which controversy, sur-
rounding competing designs, uses and norms that are advocated by
different groups, subsides. At this point, specific designs, uses or norms
become generally accepted. One interpretation of how a technology
should be designed or used becomes the norm. 80 Up to the point of clo-
sure there is an interpretive flexibility regarding potential designs and
uses. But, closure has far-reaching consequences. In a sense, closure re-
structures the techno-social world related to the technology. Once closure
is reached, interpretive flexibility is essentially lost, and although its recap-
ture is possible, it becomes much more difficult to re-open the controversy
and regain the status of interpretive flexibility.81
The history of the bicycle has been used to portray the concept of
closure. The bicycle as we know it today generally has two wheels of equal
size. We no longer doubt the effectiveness of this design of the bicycle for
what we conceive to be its primary function: transportation. Yet, neither
the use nor the design was settled during the early days of the bicycle. The
bicycle underwent many design alternatives until it reached its current
form.82 Furthermore, the evolution of the bicycle's design, that many to-
day view as a result of functional solutions, was in fact laden with social
value choices. 8 3
80. See Russell & Williams, supra note 11, at 120. For further discussion of
closure, see Shay David, On the Uncertainty Principle and Social Constructivism: The
Case of Free and Open-Source Software, http://www.shaydavid.info/papers/shaydavid-
scot of foss_121803.pdf (last visited May 14, 2006).
81. See BIJKER, supra note 11, at 85.
82. Id. at 19-100.
83. One striking illustration involves the effect of Victorian values on the de-
sign of the bicycle. A new design of the bicycle with the two pedals on one side was
created to enable women to side-ride the bicycle without engaging in a revealing
posture. Id. at 43.
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The history of the bicycle is not a linear history of evolution progress-
ing toward the safest and most convenient transportation vehicle.8 4 Many
bicycle designs emerged through the years, including tricycles (three
wheel bicycles) and different wheel sized bicycles. Nevertheless, two main
conceptions of the bicycle dominated its history: the bicycle as a macho
athletic vehicle and the bicycle as a mode of transportation.88
The macho bicycle that emerged around 1870 included two wheels of
unequal size. The front wheel was about ten times larger than the back
wheel. This bicycle was extremely difficult to ride and its main function
was not viewed as transportation. It was perceived as a macho sport vehi-
cle and was mainly ridden by young men. The conception of the bicycle as
a macho sports vehicle gave rise to different designs all emphasizing the
size of the front-wheel.8 6 At the same time, the alternative view of the
bicycle as a transportation vehicle instigated the creation of a series of
designs to improve safety.
Eventually the view of the bicycle as a transportation vehicle prevailed
and the safest design was selected. At that point, the bicycle has reached
closure. Interpretive flexibility regarding the design and uses of the bicy-
cle was essentially lost; the bicycle debate is unlikely to be re-opened.8 7
Closure does not mean, however, that the selected design was necessarily
the overall best or most efficient design because this determination would
depend on the use of the bicycle. It was the best design for the prevailing
use conception-transportation. 88
Closure can be a major obstacle to change as it forecloses options and
curtails flexibility.89 The debate remains open as to the degree to which
closure is necessarily final. In particular, critics have questioned whether
the concept of closure is equally applicable to all technologies or to all
aspects of complex dynamic technologies. 90 Yet, even allowing that clo-
sure is merely a matter of degree-that stabilization may be incomplete
and that controversy could potentially be re-opened-it is apparent that
closure has an impact. Once controversy subsides and individuals cease to
hold conflicting interpretations regarding social uses and designs of the
technology, our ability to transform design and uses is substantially
decreased.
Let us return to the case of the Internet and privacy norms. Despite
their awareness of the use of privacy violating tools, individual users failed
to challenge the commercial actors' information collection practices.
They did not initiate and compel a competing perception of commercial
privacy-consequendy, the non-privacy norm prevailed among commer-
84. Id. at 50-51.
85. Id. at 19-100.
86. Id. at 37-41.
87. See id. at 19-100.
88. Id. at 75.
89. See Russell & Williams, supra note 11, at 58.
90. See id. at 57.
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cial users. The Internet's critical mass point and decentralized diffusion
induced a rapid evolution of technological artifacts, such as cookies, and
of non-privacy norms. Determinations regarding designs and modes of
use, that for some technologies evolve over decades, were made rapidly,
reaching closure at an exponential rate and with it the loss of interpretive
flexibility. While the bicycle reached closure after decades of shifting be-
tween the athletic macho and transportation conception, commercial
non-privacy norms reached closure within several years. Once interpretive
flexibility was lost, the reversal of existing privacy practices is likely to en-
counter increased difficulties.
C. Law & Social Norms Theory
Additional support for the significance of timing can be drawn from
law and social norms literature. Law and social norms literature does not
address the issue of timing directly; instead it focuses on the reduced effec-
tiveness of legal measures where they stand in stark contradiction to ex-
isting social norms.
The literature shows that laws are less likely to be effective where they
sharply digress from existing social norms.9 1 Imagine a law aimed at re-
ducing instances of drug and alcohol use among youngsters by requiring
that individuals under twenty-one years of age live with their parents, an
adult guardian or a government institution. Such a law would contradict
deeply engrained liberal convictions expecting the young American to
leave home in a quest for self-fulfillment, whether through studies or
work.92 Consequently, it is unlikely to be effective in changing relation-
ships between young adults and parents.
Conversely, the literature shows that laws are generally more effective
where a new rule does not digress from a community's expectations and
social meanings of certain acts. 9 3 For example, a law requiring that chil-
dren under five reside with an adult, a guardian or an appropriate institu-
tion does not deviate from existing social norms that accept that very
young children are unable to care for themselves. Such a law is, therefore,
more likely to accomplish effective compliance.9 4
91. See Kahan, supra note 13, at 608; Scott, supra note 13, at 1926-28.
92. See ROBERTY NEALV BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM
AND COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE 62 (rev. ed. 1996).
93. See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of
Internalized Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1597 (2000) (stating "tt]he primary way to
prompt people to instill civic virtue in each other is by aligning law with morality");
Robinson, supra note 14, at 1858 (explaining that deference to layman intuitions is
useful because it enhances criminal laws' normative control power).
94. Lawrence Lessig differentiates between offensive and defensive uses of so-
cial meanings construction. Some laws seek offensively to transform social mean-
ing construction while others seek to defensively maintain an existing social
meaning and prevent it from changing. Lessig concludes that defensive social
meaning construction is more likely to be effective than offensive social meaning
construction. See Lessig, supra note 14, at 986-87, 999. The law requiring individu-
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Looking back to laws that diverge substantially from existing social
norms, it appears that such laws may not only be less effective in trans-
forming social norms, but may actually backfire by enhancing the very
norms they seek to change.95 It was suggested, for instance, in the context
of criminal law, that some crimes may be self-defeating. In other words,
criminalizing the behavior may, in fact, result in bolstering the social
norm that the crime was designed to dilute.9 6
Specifically, the insights described above shed light on instances of
non-compliance involving laws that are structured to regulate conduct re-
lated to uses of new technologies. Laws criminalizing uses of technologies
that amount to a copyright violation have been particularly ineffective. A
prominent example involves peer-to-peer file sharing. Despite numerous
lawsuits by the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) against
file-sharers, file sharing remains a prevalent phenomenon. 9 7 Dominant
social norms do not conceive of file sharing as immoral conduct and it
appears that copyright violations are not embedded with social stigma.98
Hence, peer-to-peer file sharing remains an extensive practice despite le-
gal action. The inefficacy of prohibitory laws designed to reinforce contra-
als to reside with adults until age twenty-one would be an example of a law seeking
offensive meaning construction. The law requiring children under five to reside
with adults could be viewed as defensive meaning construction if it was enacted to
deal with, say, a concern regarding an evolving trend of use of private boarding
schools for children of tender years.
95. See generally Francesco Parisi & George Von Wagenheim, Legislation and
Countervailing Effects from Social Norms, in THE EVOLUTION AND DESIGN OF INSTITU-
TIONS (C. Shubert and G. Von Wagenheim eds., 2006), http://www.papers.ssrn.
com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=569383.
96. See William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REv. 1871, 1872
(2000).
97. See Ben Depoorter, Sven Vanneste et al., Gentle Nudges v. Hard Shoves in
Copyright Law: An Empirical Study on the Conflict Between Norms and Enforcement,
(Ghent Ctr. for Advanced Studies in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 6, 2005 at
3), http://www.law.ugent.be/grond/casle; David W. Opderbeck, Peer to Peer Net-
works, Technological Evolution and Intellectual Property Reverse Private Attorney General
Litigation, 20 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 1685 (2005); ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
RIAA V. THE PEOPLE: Two YEARS LATER, http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/RFAAatTWO-
FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 8. 2006); Jefferson Graham, File-Sharing Beat Goes On,
USA TODAY, June 29, 2005, at 3B. But cf. Lee Rainie & Mary Madden, Pew Internet
Project and Comscore Mediametrix Data Memo: The State of Music Downloading and File-
Sharing Online (Apr. 2004), http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/pip-filesharing-
April_04.pdf (last visited May 14, 2006). For a general discussion of the effect of
law on file-sharing social norms, see Yuval Feldman & Janice Nadler, Expressive Law
and File Sharing Norms, Northwestern University School of Law Public Law and Le-
gal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 12-05, http://www.ssrn.com
(last visited May 14, 2006).
98. See Steven A. Hechter, The Music Industry's Failed Attempt to Influence File
Sharing Norms, 7 VAND.J. Err. L. & PRAc. 10, 10-13 (2004); Chris Collins, Download-
ing Lowdown: File-Sharing Is the Moral Equivalent of Stealing a Car, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct.
25, 2003 (quoting Gallop poll showing that only 18% of 13- to 17-year olds consid-
ered cheating on test morally acceptable, while 83% considered downloading mu-
sic through file-sharing to be morally acceptable).
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dictory social norms is not restricted to the file sharing phenomenon.
Similar trends have been identified with regard to unauthorized copying
of software, music CDs and videotapes.99 In all these instances of social
norms related to unauthorized copying individuals do not perceive the
conduct as immoral. Consequently, unauthorized copying remains preva-
lent despite prohibitory copyright protection rules.
Law and social norms scholars have offered two main theories to ex-
plain this counter-intuitive phenomenon. One theory focuses on the na-
ture of the task that the law is charged with. Under this explanation, the
law has an easier task when implementing a rule that does not contradict
existing social norms because the prohibited conduct is already embedded
with social stigma.100 People obey the law because they fear the disap-
proval of their social group. They follow the social norms of their group
because they would be rewarded for following them and sanctioned for
failing to do so. Hence, the law is not required to re-structure social
stigma. Its role is limited to reinforcing existing stigma structures and dis-
ciplining violators who do not abide by social expectations. Conversely,
where a norm does not carry social stigma, instead of fearing social sanc-
tions violators often receive sympathy when breaking the law prohibiting
this conduct. The law is faced by a much more arduous mission that re-
quires transforming structures of social stigma in order to accomplish
compliance. 10 1
An alternative theory concerns legitimacy. Two main factors contrib-
ute to legal compliance. One is deterrence-the effect of potential legal
sanctions and benefits. The second is legitimacy-the belief that the law-
making authority and the substantive content of the law are entitled to
deference. 10 2 Studies show that legitimacy is undermined when the con-
tent of the law diverges from social norms.1 0 3 Consequently, where a law
departs from accepted social norms a crucial ingredient of compliance is
lost and the law is less likely to be effective.
Law and social norms theory suggests that an attempt at social shap-
ing, after norms related to a technology are entrenched is likely to en-
counter a significant hurdle. The history of privacy on the Internet
illustrates this point. Non-privacy norms are currently prevalent among
the Internet's commercial users. They have existed and been reinforced
since the mid-1990s. Although only the Internet's commercial actors exer-
cise the non-privacy norms, studies show that law encounters enforcement
99. See Stuart P. Green, Plagiarism, Norms, and the Limits of Theft Law: Some
Observations on the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 167, 173, 236-37 (2002).
100. See Parisi and Von Wagenheim, supra note 95, at 3.
101. See Lessig, supra note 14, at 999; Robinson, supra note 14, at 1861-63; Lior
Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: Commodify-
ing California's Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1266-67 (2000).
102. See ToM R. TYLER, WHYw PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 19-57 (1990).
103. See id.; Parisi & Von Wagenheim, supra note 95, at 26-28.
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hurdles even where the norm that the law seeks to enforce is held only by
part of the population. The failure of national prohibition provides a
prime example of the law's inefficacy in accomplishing compliance and
transforming social norms, even where a significant portion of the public
supports the change. 10 4 Commercial users of the Internet are a dominant
group both online and offline. Consequently, non-privacy norms, actively
used by this group will likely be hard to change. Existing personal infor-
mation collection and privacy norms are currently not enshrouded with
social stigma. Hence, a legal effort to transform these norms would face
the hurdle of transforming stigma structures in cyberspace. The hurdles
faced by such a delayed legal reaction highlight the significance of defer-
ring to timing when evaluating reactions to technologies that are charac-
terized by a critical mass point quality, decentralized diffusion and
concealed monitoring.
V. MODES OF EARLY SocIAL SHAPING
The theoretical insights discussed in the previous Part point to the
relatively narrow window of opportunity for privacy protection that is avail-
able where a new technology has a critical mass point quality, decentral-
ized diffusion and imposes a concealed threat. In such instances, both
legal and technological privacy protection measures are likely to be less
effective beyond the initial period of change and fluidity. In these cases,
timing is of the essence. I seek in this Part to explore the ways in which
both legal and technological decision-makers can sensitize their decisions
to account for the importance of timing when dealing with new technolo-
gies that share the aforementioned characteristics.
I do not suggest that early shaping could be warranted only where
these characteristics exist. Nor do I maintain that early social shaping is
always the best resolution in these cases. I propose, however, that the exis-
tence of these conditions should raise a flag of urgency. Decision-makers
faced with such instances should give the option of early social shaping
particularly careful consideration. Although social shaping at a later point
could still be possible, and could take place through user interaction, early
social shaping should be carefully evaluated because options and modes of
shaping may be considerably more limited at a later point. 10 5
In the case of the Internet, a decade after the development of com-
mercial non-privacy norms-and in the absence of a significant legal or
technological reaction-the window of opportunity may already be partly
closed. This is not to say that options are unavailable to influence non-
privacy norms. The task faced by legal decision-makers and technological
104. See generally RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1995); DAVID E. KYVING, REPEALING NATIONAL PROHIBITION (1979).
105. Options may still be available for changing entrenched social norms al-
though they may be more limited. See generally Parisi & Von Wagenheim, supra
note 95 (noting descriptions and proposals demonstrating possibilities of trans-
forming entrenched social norms); Strahilevitz, supra note 101 (same).
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designers at this point, however, is significantly more difficult than the one
encountered ten or even five years ago.
At the same time, the examination of Internet commercial non-pri-
vacy norms carries significance beyond offering a potential resolution for
transforming the specific non-privacy norms at issue. Technologies shar-
ing the characteristics that lead to rapid entrenchment of non-privacy
norms are likely to emerge. The current trend in monitoring devices
points to a development of increasingly invisible tracking mechanisms,
such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) tags that can be invisibly
implanted in objects such as passports or even currency. 10 6 Furthermore,
the Internet's critical mass point and decentralized diffusion qualities that
led to the entrenchment of commercial non-privacy norms on the In-
ternet could serve as a platform for the emergence of other non-privacy
norms. 107
Both legal and technological modes of social shaping are influenced
where the technological characteristics of a technology point to the signifi-
cance of timing. The passage of time reduces the effectiveness of both
modes of shaping. Yet, both modes can be sensitized to timing.
Technological design to protect privacy can take place during the pe-
riod of initial design where the technology is constructed to meet func-
tional requirements.' 0 8 For example, a medical database that is designed
for effective collection and retrieval of medical information can also be
programmed to ensure that unauthorized personnel will be denied access
to the information. Alternatively, technological design for privacy can be
executed at a later stage, once individuals are using the technology and
the privacy threat becomes apparent. The P3P project was an example of
subsequent technological design. It consisted of privacy protecting design
that was added to Internet browsers at a later stage.
Initial and subsequent designs are not necessarily alternative options.
In many cases, a technology would be designed initially and then subse-
106. See generally ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER, RADIO FREQUENCY
IDENTIFICATION (RFID) SYSTEMS, http://wvw.epic.org/privacy/rfid (last visited
Apr. 8, 2006).
107. For other examples of non privacy norms, see generally Michael L. Rus-
tad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH L. REv. 335 (2005) (dis-
cussing ISPs and non-privacy norms); Frank Pasquale, Theorizing the Law of Search:
Toward Authoritative and Responsible Metadata Providers (unpublished manuscript on
file with author) (discussing search engines and non-privacy norms).
108. An example of a proactive project of early social shaping through design
is UrbanSim. See Batya Friedman, Peter H. Kahn & Alan Borning, Value Sensitive
Design and Information Systems, in HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION IN MANAGEMENT
INFORMATION SYsTEMs 9-12, 14 (P. Zhang & D. Galletta, eds. forthcoming 2006),
http://epl.scu.edu:16080/-stsvalues/readings.html. For a description of the chal-
lenges of early social shaping through design, see, Mary Flanagan, Daniel Howe &
Helen Nissenbaum, Embodying Values in Technology: Theory and Practice, 21-26, http:/
/www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/Nissenbaum-VID.4-25.pdf (last vis-
ited, Apr., 8, 2006).
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quently redesigned through user participation. 10 9 Yet, the problems en-
countered in the P3P experiment point to the significance of making a
concerted effort to design for privacy at the outset. Decentralized technol-
ogies require user action to transform privacy preference design. Where
the technology is broadly diffused, non-privacy norms are likely to be wide-
spread. Consequently, extensive user cooperation is needed to implement
privacy enhancing design. The P3P case shows that where the technology
enables concealed privacy monitoring, user adoption of privacy protecting
tools is less likely. This is particularly the case where the privacy harm is
not accompanied with a more tangible or salient harm, such as identity
theft or computer malfunction. 1 10 Consequently, a proactive and con-
certed approach to design privacy protection at the outset is likely to be
most important for interactive technologies that have a critical mass point
quality, are decentralized and are likely to enable concealed
monitoring. 111
Legal decision-makers considering potential privacy protection of
technologies that are prone to rapid norm entrenchment and enable con-
cealed monitoring should account for the issue of timing in their decision-
making process. This is not to say that early shaping should always be
preferred. Additional considerations may outweigh the timing factor. My
argument is constrained to emphasizing the need for decision-making to
be particularly sensitive to timing in the above-specified circumstances.
Furthermore, I do not endeavor to give exact estimates of the breadth
of the window of opportunity for early legal social shaping. 1 12 The
breadth of such a window may vary between technologies. Looking back
to the case study of commercial norms on the Internet, one example
stands out. Unlike collection of adult personal information by commer-
cial entities, the collection of children's personal information received
early attention by the legislature. The Child Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA), which applied to the collection of personal information from
children under thirteen, was enacted in 1998.113 By April, 2000, a Federal
Trade Commission rule pursuant to COPPA was in effect. 14 COPPA in-
cluded requirements that directly limited collection of personal informa-
109. See Friedman, Kahn & Borning, supra note 108, at 13-14.
110. Individuals are more likely to install software and firewalls to prevent
computer harm by viruses or spyware than to protect themselves against collection
of information harms. They are also more likely to take precautionary measures to
avoid identity theft, mainly by being more cautious about giving their personally
identifiable information online.
111. Proactive designing for privacy is already taking place through the POR-
TIA Project. For a description of the project, see Dan Boneh, Joan Feigenbaum &
Avi Silberschatz, PORTIA, Privacy, Obligations, and Rights in Technologies of Informa-
tion Assessment, http://crypto.stanford.edu/portia (last visited Apr., 8, 2006).
112. Views differ as to the appropriate timing of early legal social shaping.
See, e.g., Swire, supra note 21, at 863-71.
113. COPPA, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b) (2000).
114. See 16 C.F.R. § 312.1 (1999).
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tion about children.1 15 Website operators are prohibited from collecting
personal information about children unless they obtain verifiable parental
consent.' 16 In addition, website operators are prohibited from condition-
ing a child's participation in a game, the offering of a prize or other activi-
ties on a child's disclosure of more personal information than is
reasonably necessary for participation.
1 1 7
The main bulk of empirical data regarding compliance was collected
a year after the COPPA restrictions came into effect. Yet, even this early
data shows significant reductions in the personal information collected
about children and a growing compliance with parental notification re-
quirements. 1 1 8 Furthermore, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, a
privacy watchdog, recently issued a letter to the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, in which it urged additional compliance research, but stated that:
"There is a sense of increasing compliance, that COPPA has curtailed the
development of a large data collection culture targeting children on-
line."' 1 9 Although additional research needs to be conducted regarding
COPPA compliance, early legal social shaping appears to have created dif-
ferent privacy social norms on the Internet regarding personal informa-
tion of children from those applying to adult personal information. The
creation of two different sets of privacy norms in a relatively similar situa-
tion support the significance of timing in this context.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article sought to commence an inquiry into the relationship be-
tween time, technology and privacy. My goal was not to advocate early
social shaping as an ultimate resolution for protection of privacy against
new technological threats. Instead, I aspired, through careful examina-
tion of the case of Internet commercial privacy norms, to provide initial
guidelines as to when timing becomes an important factor in structuring
social reactions to privacy threats.
This Article identified three conditions that lead to rapid entrench-
ment of non-privacy norms: critical mass point quality; decentralized diffu-
sion; and concealed monitoring. It showed that where these conditions
exist timing becomes of the essence and both technological and legal
modes of social shaping are affected. The Article proposed that under
these conditions, social shaping through technological design would be
115. See COPPA, 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b) (2000).
116. See id. § 6502(b)(1)(A) (ii).
117. See id. § 6502(b)(1)(C).
118. See CENTER FOR MEDIA EDUCATION, COPPA: THE FIRST YEAR: A SURVEY OF
SITEs- A REPORT ON WEB SITE COMPLIANCE, 7 (2001) (reporting early success of
COPPA); FTC, Protecting Children's Privacy Under COPPA: A Survey on Compliance, 3-6,
13-14 (Apr. 2002) (same).
119. Letter from Electronic Privacy Information Center to FTC (June 27,
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more effective through concerted proactive design for privacy protection
at the outset. As for legal social shaping, it suggested that although early
social shaping may not always be the appropriate response under these
conditions, timing needs to be considered as an important factor in legal
decision-making.
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